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Introduction
This nice paper contains three main ideas. First, the euro area business cycle 
is less dispersed than it used to be. Second, it does not seem that the euro has 
contributed in any way to this change. Third, the euro area business cycle 
is the U.S./  global business cycle. This is therefore a paper with a minimalist 
view on the role of the euro on the euro area business cycle.
My ﬁ  rst reaction after reading the paper was: could we really expect any 
diﬀerent result? We know since Baxter and Stockman (1989) that, at least 
in developed countries, exchange rate regimes are almost irrelevant to the 
characteristics of the business cycle. If anything, we should expect that in 
a currency area, the inability to use the nominal exchange rate as a tool to 
induce a fast and correct adjustment of relative prices should lead to a higher 
relevance of country- speciﬁ  c shocks. Hence the paper should be interpreted 
not only as suggesting that it is too soon to tell, but more broadly as a con-
ﬁ  rmation of the Baxter- Stockman view of the quasi- irrelevance of exchange 
rate regimes for the business cycle.
The authors ﬁ  nd that the euro area business cycle is less dispersed than it 
used to be. They attribute this outcome to the Great Moderation, but their 
proof is informed a little bit too much by eyeballing the situation. The idea 
seems to be the following. Suppose there are no shocks in any economy 
of the area. This implies zero volatility in all countries, and therefore zero 
dispersion. However, the Great Moderation refers to a concept of absolute 
volatility, whereas the reduction in the dispersion of the volatility is a relative 
concept: in other words, volatility must have dropped more in some coun-
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tries relative to others to induce a fall in the dispersion of business cycles. 
Figure 4C.1 compares, for each country of the euro area, the standard devia-
tion of GDP growth across two subsamples:1 1970–  1985, and 1986–  2006. 
We see the volatility moderation at work, but we also see some heterogene-
ity. The Great Moderation has been particularly strong in Portugal and 
Greece, and less so in Italy and Spain. There is very little evidence of the 
Great Moderation in Germany, whereas Ireland and Finland experienced 
the opposite, a Great Ampliﬁ  cation rather than moderation. It is legitimate 
to think that the transition to the euro (rather than the euro per se) did 
have some eﬀect here. Despite the euro being a common enterprise, it obvi-
ously produced diﬀerential eﬀects across countries. But why exactly did these 
diﬀerential eﬀects occur? Was it because some countries had to forcefully 
reduce nominal exchange rate volatility? Was it because the unpredictable 
component of monetary policy was minimized in those countries? Or was 
it instead because a better-  anchored monetary policy during the transition 
also produced relatively more macroeconomic stability? Surprisingly, we do 
not know much about this indirect eﬀect of the euro, neither from theory 
nor from any empirical analysis.
Figure 4C.2 displays the correlation of GDP growth in country i with 
GDP growth in country j, for all j  i, and averaged across j. This is a mea-
sure, computed over ten-  year rolling windows, of the comovement of GDP 
1. The GDP data are annual PPP adjusted, and have been kindly provided by the authors.
Figure 4C.1  Standard deviation of GDP growthComment on Chapter 4    4 4 9
growth of country i with the rest of the area. We clearly see evidence of con-
vergence, especially for the countries of the so-called periphery (Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece, and Spain). Yet we also see that this convergence process 
is by no means coincident with the introduction of the euro, but progressed 
gradually from the early 1980s on.2
While it may seem almost conventional wisdom that a process of conver-
gence in business- cycle comovement started much earlier than the introduc-
tion of the euro, it is less easy to come up with a well- identiﬁ  ed explanation. 
Some usual suspects quickly come to mind: was it trade or was it ﬁ  nancial 
integration? Was it policy convergence instead? Or rather, was it simply good 
luck? Identifying the appropriate explanation would require an extensive 
empirical analysis that is virtually absent in the literature. Here, however, I 
would like to make the following simple point. Choose your favorite usual 
suspect as an explanation of the convergence in business cycles in the euro 
area: the existing theory would not be very helpful.
Figure 4C.2  Rolling correlation of GDP growth with remaining euro area 
countries (average)
2. Notice the breakdown in the correlation of GDP growth in Greece with the rest of the 
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Suspect I: Trade
There is strong empirical evidence that higher trade enhances coﬂ  uc-
tuations (Frankel and Rose [1998]; Clark and van Wincoop [2001]; Otto 
et al. [2001]). In Kose and Yi (2006), doubling the median trade intensity 
increases bilateral cross- correlation of GDP growth by 0.06 in OECD coun-
tries. The problem, though, comes with the theory. It is very diﬃcult to 
generate a link between trade and comovement within standard dynamic 
equilibrium models (Kose and Yi [2001]). If asset markets are complete 
(and even if productivity shocks are correlated across countries), a higher 
trade intensity leads to a lower cross-  country correlation of output. The 
idea is that increased openness enhances the swings in international rela-
tive prices (terms of trade), thereby exacerbating the negative comovement 
across countries. Here comes a double irony. First, lower transport costs 
(symbolizing globalization) make the problem worse, because they are 
isomorphic to increasing openness. Second, if one increases the elasticity 
of substitution between domestically produced and imported goods, the 
problem gets even worse. The irony here is that it is trade theorists—not 
international macroeconomists—who think that that elasticity of substitu-
tion is particularly high.
There are at least two options to ﬁ  x this problem. The ﬁ  rst is to assume 
ﬁ  nancial autarky, but this is obviously unrealistic. The second is vertical 
specialization of production. Vertical specialization occurs when countries 
specialize in only particular stages of a good’s production sequence. Yi 
(2003) shows that vertical specialization explains a substantial share of the 
increase in world trade after World War II. Vertical specialization is certainly 
a phenomenon that has widely characterized the increase in trade within 
the euro area in the past twenty- ﬁ  ve years. Although this concept has found 
very limited application in the business cycle literature, it seems a promis-
ing avenue to strengthen the ability of standard models to generate realistic 
cross- country  comovement.
Suspect II: Financial Integration
Financial integration (FI) is an alternative potential candidate to explain 
the business-  cycle convergence observed in the euro area over time. The 
existing empirical evidence suggests that FI enhances coﬂ  uctuations (Imbs 
[2004]). However, once again, theory is not particularly helpful. A standard 
two-  country dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model with complete 
international ﬁ  nancial markets (as in Backus et al. [1994]) would predict 
that stronger ﬁ  nancial integration leads to a lower international correlation 
of output. Intuitively, access to complete asset markets allows the diversify-
ing of idiosyncratic (country-  speciﬁ  c in this case) risk. Hence generating 
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is a challenge for open- economy DGE models. At the same time, empirically, 
it is not completely clear whether the euro area has become fully ﬁ  nancially 
integrated. It is obvious that it has, if one looks at the government bonds 
market. Figure 4C.3 displays the dispersion in the ten-  year government 
bonds spreads across euro area countries, and shows a dramatic decline in 
the past ﬁ  fteen years.
When one looks at credit markets, though, the picture is far less clear. Fig-
ure 4C.4 shows, for instance, the cross-  country dispersion in (comparable) 
mortgage loan rates in the euro area countries. The degree of dispersion is 
still sizeable and, surprisingly, has even increased substantially over time. In 
general, it is widely acknowledged that large diﬀerences remain among the 
institutional characteristics of mortgage markets in the euro area. This is 
particularly relevant for the centralized transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy in the euro area.3
Suspect III: Policy Integration (PI) versus Good Luck
Figure 4C.5 gives a dramatic visual impression of how striking the pro-
cess of monetary policy convergence has been in the euro area. Was policy 
integration per se in any way responsible for the observed degree of conver-
Figure 4C.3  Dispersion in ten-  year bond yield spreads
Source: European Central Bank
3. See Calza et al. (2008).Figure 4C.4  Dispersion in ﬁ  ve-  to-ten-  year mortgage loan rates 
Source: European Central Bank
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gence in business cycles in the euro area? Surprisingly, we know very little 
about this issue. One thing we know, though, is that answering this question 
requires the virtues of a fully structural DGE model, and we have made 
substantial progress on this front recently.4
Armed with these tools, it would seem particularly urgent to pursue a 
research agenda that we could summarize in the following questions: (i) 
Does PI lead to stronger coﬂ  uctuations (and has this actually happened in 
the euro area)? (ii) Is it “convergence per se” or is it “convergence to good 
policy”? (iii) Has policy integration contributed to the Great Moderation 
in Europe, as well as to the diﬀerential impact of the Great Moderation in 
diﬀerent countries (as argued above)? (iv) Can we disentangle policy integra-
tion from simple good luck?
Conclusions
This paper presents a series of key facts that characterize the business 
cycle in the euro area. It argues convincingly that the euro per se is unlikely 
to have produced any form of convergence in business cycles. At the same 
time it leaves two fundamental questions still open: (i) What was the cause 
of the convergence? (ii) Can theory help us to diﬀerentiate among alterna-
tive hypotheses? I have tried to argue that addressing the latter question is 
more diﬃcult than may have been anticipated, and that progress on this front 
remains limited. As Europeans, we should not be particularly proud.
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